

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 207521

44

ORIGIN INR-07

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 EA-07 /027 R

DRAFTED BY INR/REA/NA:MCBAIRD
APPROVED BY INR/DDR:MPACKMAN
INR/REA:HEHOROWITZ.
EA/K:PMAYHEW
EUR/RPM:TSAVAGE

----- 068185

R 201802Z AUG 76
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO OIC PTC
INFO USMISSION NATO
ALL NATO CAPITALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 207521

PASS FOLLOWING VIA THE NATO-WIDE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
RR RWFVA RWFVB RWFVD RWFVE RWFVF RFWFG RFWFH RFWFI RFWFK
RFWFL RFWFM RFWFN RFWFO RFWFP RFWFQ RFWFR RFWFZ
DE RWFWS 7521 2331820
ZNY CCCCC
R 201802Z AUG 76

FROM WASHINGTON
TO AIG 6006, 6007
B T
NATO CONFIDENTIAL FROM WASHINGTON

POLITICAL ANALYSIS: NORTH KOREA: POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH
THE MILITARY

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. RECENT UNUSUAL CHANGE INVOLVING MILI-
TARY LEADERS IN THE KOREAN WORKERS PARTY (KWP) SUGGESTS
THAT KIM IL-SONG IS ENGAGED IN ANOTHER PERIODIC EFFORT TO
STRENGTHEN PARTY CONTROL OF THE KOREAN PEOPLES ARMY (KPA).
THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN, WHICH HAS SURFACED IN THE PROPAGANDA
AS A DEBATE OF "WEAPONS VERSUS MEN," IS APPARENTLY INTENDED
BOTH TO UPGRADE THE ROLE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AND REVOLU-
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 207521

TIONARY POLITICAL TACTICS IN STRATEGIC PLANNING AND TO GIVE
KIM A TOOL WITH WHICH TO ATTACK FACTIONAL OPPONENTS.

2. THE CAMPAIGN IS NOT INTENDED TO ABANDON PRIMARY

RELIANCE--FOR BOTH NATIONAL DEFENSE AND POSSIBLE FIGHTING IN THE SOUTH--ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND THE REGULAR ARMY. NONETHELESS, IT REFLECTS KIM'S IMPATIENCE WITH THE TENDENCY OF THE KPA TO DOWNGRADE THE PEOPLES MILITIA AND TO SHUN THE DIFFICULT WORK OF BUILDING AGENT NETWORKS IN THE SOUTH. IT MAY ALSO REFLECT KIM'S INTENT TO RID THE LEADERSHIP OF MEN WHO MIGHT BE INCLINED TO OPPOSE HIS SON'S SUCCESSION TO POWER. END SUMMARY

3. BEGIN TEXT. THE "WEAPONS VERSUS MEN" ISSUE:

4. DEBATE OF THE "WEAPONS VERSUS MEN" ISSUE IS NOT NEW IN NORTH KOREA, BUT IT HAS BEEN GIVEN PARTICULAR ATTENTION DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS AND SEEMS SINCE LATE 1975 TO HAVE LAID THE GROUND FOR A PARTIAL PURGE OF MILITARY AND SECURITY OFFICIALS. THE PROPAGANDA--INCLUDING ARMY DAY SPEECHES AND ARTICLES IN KULLOJA, THE THEORETICAL JOURNAL OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE--HAS ARGUED THAT THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN MILITARY OPERATIONS IS NOT "TECHNIQUE," IT IS "MAN." THE VALUE PLACED ON MAN IN CONTRAST TO WEAPONS, THESE MESSAGES CONTINUE, DISTINGUISHES A "REVOLUTIONARY" STAND FROM A "REACTIONARY" AND "OPPORTUNISTIC" ONE. (THIS IS NOT UNLIKE THE "RED VERSUS EXPERT" DEBATE IN CHINA.)

5. KIM'S OPPONENTS HAVE BEEN BRANDED "COMMUNIST OPPORTUNISTS," "COMMUNIST ADVENTURISTS," AND "FACTIONAL FLUNKIES," AND THEY ARE BEING ACCUSED OF HAVING "VICIOUSLY PLOTTED, EACH WITH HIS OWN ULTERIOR MOTIVE, TO RUIN THE KOREAN REVOLUTION, ROOT AND BRANCH." THEY APPARENTLY ARE SUSPECTED NOT ONLY OF INSUFFICIENT ENTHUSIASM FOR KIM'S POLICIES BUT ALSO OF COUNTERMANDING PARTY ORDERS. THEIR ALLEGED "CRIMES" INCLUDE:

(A)--LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE;

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 207521

(B)--OPPOSITION TO THE CONCEPT OF TOTAL MOBILIZATION, AND DOWNGRADING OF THE ROLE OF THE WORKERS-PEASANTS RED MILITIA; AND

(C)--RELUCTANCE TO PUSH FORWARD WITH THE PAINSTAKING, AND SO FAR LARGELY UNPRODUCTIVE, WORK OF BUILDING AGENT NETWORKS IN THE SOUTH.

6. THIS BILL OF PARTICULARS CLOSELY PARALLELS THE CHARGES

THAT KIM REPORTEDLY LEVELED AT THE TOP MILITARY OFFICERS HE PURGED IN 1968. THE PROBLEMS ARE PERSISTENT, REFLECTING INSTITUTIONALIZED CONFLICT BETWEEN A GENERATION THAT CAME TO PROMINENCE THROUGH ITS GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES AND YOUNGER,

BUREAUCRATIZED CAREER OFFICERS WHOSE OUTLOOK HAS BEEN MOLDED BY DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET ARMS AND CONVENTIONAL WARFARE TECHNIQUES.

7. IT IS NOT CLEAR IF A WORSENING OF THIS CONFLICT UNDERLIES RECENT ATTEMPTS BY KIM AND THE RULING PARTY TO REASSERT INFLUENCE OVER THE MILITARY. GIVEN THE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS FACING KIM, HIS CAMPAIGN MAY ONLY BE A REFLECTION OF HIS SPECIAL SENSITIVITIES AT THIS TIME.

(A)--GLORIFYING THE ROLE OF "MEN" AND MINIMIZING THAT OF "WEAPONS" IS COMMON IN TIMES OF ECONOMIC HARDSHIP. PRESENTLY, NORTH KOREA'S FOREIGN TRADE PROGRAM IS IN RUINS, ITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN BEHIND SCHEDULE, AND ITS RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW--THE KEY SOURCE OF FINANCIAL AND MILITARY AID--COOL.

(B)--SOUTH KOREA'S POLITICAL FABRIC HAS PROVED STRONGER THAN PYONGYANG HAD ANTICIPATED, AND IT IS PROBABLY NOW APPARENT THAT INTENSIFIED AGENT ACTIVITIES WILL BE NEEDED IF NORTH KOREA HOPES TO BUILD A MASS BASE OF SUPPORT FOR REUNIFICATION ON ITS OWN TERMS.

(C)--OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE, KIM IS PREPARING FOR A POTENTIALLY CONTROVERSIAL SUCCESSION BY HIS SON, KIM CHONG-IL, THE FIRST FAMILY SUCCESSION EVER ATTEMPTED IN A COMMUNIST STATE. HE IS UNDOUBTEDLY SENSITIVE ABOUT ANY SIGNS OF CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 207521

DISLOYALTY IN THE ARMY, THE KEY INTEREST GROUP THAT COULD THREATEN HIS PLANS.

8. THE LEADERSHIP CRISIS:

9. APART FROM THE APPEARANCE OF THE "WEAPONS VERSUS MEN" DEBATE IN THE MEDIA, KIM'S FIRST DISCERNIBLE MOVE TO STRENGTHEN HIS AUTHORITY OCCURRED IN SEPTEMBER 1975. AT THAT TIME, YIM CHUN-CHU REPLACED KIM CHUNG-NIN AS HEAD OF THE PARTY'S LIAISON BUREAU, THE ORGAN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NORTH KOREAN PROGRAM OF POLITICAL AND SUBVERSIVE ACTION TARGETED AGAINST SOUTH KOREA. A MONTH LATER, YU CHANG-SIK, DEPUTY OF THE LIAISON BUREAU AND A RELATIVELY YOUNG OFFICIAL WHO HAD SEEMED TO BE ONE OF THE KWP'S FASTEST RISING STARS, WAS REMOVED. YU HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH BOTH THE COVERT WORK OF THE LIAISON BUREAU AND THE OVERT DEALINGS OF THE NOW MORIBUND NORTH-SOUTH COORDINATING

COMMITTEE, WHICH HAD BEEN CREATED IN 1972 TO EXPLORE AVENUES FOR POLITICAL INTERCHANGE.

10. FOLLOWING A QUIET WINTER, THE LEADERSHIP CRISIS APPARENTLY REACHED A PEAK THIS SPRING AT A SECRET PLENUM OF THE

KWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE, WHICH WAS CONVENED SOME TIME PRIOR TO THE SUPREME PEOPLES ASSEMBLY (SPA) SESSION OF APRIL 27. KIM IL-SONG PROBABLY USED THIS MEETING--ONLY THE SECOND UNANNOUNCED CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM OF 12 HELD DURING THE PAST SIX YEARS--TO DENOUNCE HIS FACTIONAL OPPONENTS.

11. PERSONNEL CHANGES THAT BECAME EVIDENT AT THE APRIL SPA SESSION, AFTER APPARENTLY HAVING BEEN DECIDED AT THE UNANNOUNCED PARTY PLENUM, INCLUDED THE PROMOTION TO POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP OF:

(A)--O PAEK-YONG, A FULL GENERAL WHO IS BELIEVED TO BE THE OFFICIAL IN CHARGE OF THE PEOPLES MILITIA, AND

(B)--COLONEL GENERAL KIM CHOL-MAN, THE FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF IN THE KPA.

THIS PROMOTION OF KIM CHOL-MAN, ON THE HEELS OF HIS HAVING CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 207521

BECOME IN FEBRUARY 1976 THE ONLY DEPUTY EVER CHOSEN TO DELIVER THE ANNUAL ARMY DAY ADDRESS, SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT SOON MOVE INTO THE CHIEF OF STAFF POST. PYONGYANG HAS SINCE NAMED FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF O CHIN-U TO THE DEFENSE MINISTRY JOB, BUT KIM CHOL-MAN HAS SO FAR NOT MOVED UP; THE KPA CHIEF POSITION APPARENTLY REMAINS UNFILLED.

12. ALTHOUGH A PURGE ON THE DIMENSIONS OF THE 1968 HOUSE-CLEANING IS NOT YET APPARENT IN THE KWP POLITICAL COMMITTEE KIM IL-SONG IS, AT A MINIMUM, PROBABLY UNDERTAKING A SIGNIFICANT SHUFFLE OF ARMY OFFICERS AT LOWER LEVELS. A KULLO-JA ARTICLE, WRITTEN THIS PAST MARCH BY O PAEK-YONG, SEEMS DESIGNED, IN PART, TO SET THE STAGE FOR A PURGE. SPEAKING OF KIM'S OPPONENTS IN THE ALLEGORICAL TERMS OF A CRISIS IN THE EARLY 1930S, IT NOTES THAT "IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONSOLIDATE A SOLID BASE FOR THE KOREAN REVOLUTION WITHOUT ELIMINATING THE RECKLESS MANEUVERS OF THE KNAVES" AND THAT THE "EXISTING SITUATION POSED IT AS A PRESSING QUESTION TO CRUSH THE VICIOUS MACHINATIONS OF THE ENEMIES WITHIN AND WITHOUT."

13. THE POLICY ADJUSTMENTS:

14. IN ADDITION TO PERSONNEL ADJUSTMENTS, KIM IL-SONG IS TACKLING THE PROBLEM OF INADEQUATE PARTY CONTROL OVER MILITARY PRIORITIES VIA:

(A)--A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, PART OF WHICH MAY BE TIED TO THE THEME "PRODUCE, WORK AND LIVE IN THE STYLE OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE GUERRILLAS," AND

(B)--INCREASED POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION FOR THE ARMY.

THE O PAEK-YONG ARTICLE IN KULLOJA SEEMS TO HINT AT MEASURES THAT MAY BE TAKEN TO REMEDY PAST LAPSES IN PURSUING REUNIFICATION GOALS. THESE INCLUDE:

(A)--UPGRADING THE WORK OF MASS POLITICAL MOVEMENTS. THIS MAY BE REFLECTED IN INCREASED VISIBILITY FOR THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE REUNIFICATION OF THE FATHERLAND AND INCREASED PROPAGANDA BROADCASTING BY THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY FOR REUNIFICATION, WHICH PYONGYANG CLAIMS OPERATES CLANDESTINELY IN THE SOUTH.

PAGE 06 STATE 207521

(B)--UPGRADING THE WORK OF INFILTRATION AGENTS IN THE SOUTH TO ESTABLISH OPERATIONS BASES AND CLANDESTINE LIAISON POINTS, PARTICULARLY "TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE NATURAL GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES OF WOODED REGIONS."

15. THERE IS NO SUGGESTION IN THE PROPAGANDA THAT PYONGYANG EXPECTS EASY OR EARLY SUCCESSES IN INFILTRATION OF THE SOUTH, AND IT IS LIKELY THAT KIM WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS STEADILY FOR GREATER EFFORTS IN THIS FIELD. END TEXT.

16. BEGIN ANNEX. KEY MILITARY-SECURITY MEN IN THE KOREAN WORKERS ARMY:

17. THE FOLLOWING EIGHT MEN ARE THE PRIMARY MILITARY AND SECURITY OFFICERS HOLDING HIGH POSTS IN THE KOREAN WORKERS PARTY (KWP). THEY ARE ALL VETERANS OF THE PREWAR, MANCHURIA-BASED, ANTI-JAPANESE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT AND HAVE HAD LONG, CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH KIM IL-SONG. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE AT PRESENT TO IDENTIFY ANY OF THEM WITH THE MILITARY ELEMENTS UNDER ATTACK. NONETHELESS, RECENT UNUSUAL CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THIS LEADING GROUP HAS ITSELF BEEN AN INDICATOR OF PROBLEMS IN PYONGYANG.

18. IN ADDITION TO THE APPARENT LACK OF A CHIEF OF STAFF FOR THE ARMY, REMARKABLE PERSONNEL DEVELOPMENTS HAVE INCLUDED POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP FOR SEVERAL OFFICERS WHOSE PROMOTION CANNOT NECESSARILY BE EXPLAINED IN TERMS OF JOB RESPONSIBILITIES, AND FLUCTUATIONS IN THE RANKINGS OF SEVERAL OFFICERS ON THE COMMITTEE.

19. CHOE HYON, A FULL GENERAL, WAS RETIRED AS DEFENSE MINISTER THIS MAY, OSTENSIBLY BECAUSE OF ILL HEALTH. PRIOR

TO THIS, HE HAD BEEN THE FIFTH-RANKED MAN ON THE KWP POLITICAL COMMITTEE. IT IS NOT YET POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE IF HE IS STILL A MEMBER.

20. CHON MUN-SOP, A COLONEL GENERAL WHOSE PRESENT AND

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 207521

RECENT PAST ASSIGNMENTS ARE NOT KNOWN, WAS APPARENTLY ADDED TO THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE BY A SECRET PLENUM OF THE KWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE HELD IN LATE 1974. THIS WAS THE SAME MEETING AT WHICH KIM IL-SONG REPORTEDLY NAMED HIS SON, KIM CHONG-IL, AS HIS SUCCESSOR. CHON HEADED THE ARMY'S GUARD BUREAU, WHICH PROTECTS NORTH KOREAN VIPs INCLUDING KIM IL-SONG, IN THE MID-SIXTIES; HIS PROMOTION TO THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE MAY REFLECT AN ENHANCED SECURITY ROLE FOR HIM. CHON ENTERED THE COMMITTEE IN THE CANDIDATE RANKS AND PRESENTLY APPEARS SLOTTED HIGH IN THAT ROSTER, ABOUT 16TH IN THE PARTY HIERARCHY.

21. KIM CHOL-MAN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, IS A COLONEL GENERAL WHO APPARENTLY WAS NAMED TO THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AT A SECRET PARTY PLENUM HELD EARLIER THIS YEAR. IN FEBRUARY 1976, KIM BECAME THE FIRST STAFF DEPUTY EVER CHOSEN TO DELIVER THE ANNUAL ARMY DAY ADDRESS, AND THIS-- COUPLED WITH HIS ADVANCEMENT TO THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE-- HAD APPEARED TO TAG HIM FOR EARLY PROMOTION TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF POST. BOTH LEADERSHIP TURNOUTS AND KIM'S PARTY RANK, HOWEVER, SUGGEST THAT THAT PROMOTION HAS NOT YET OCCURRED. KIM ENTERED THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE IN A SLOT FAR BELOW THAT WHERE A CHIEF OF STAFF NORMALLY WOULD BE RANKED AND, SUBSEQUENT TO O CHIN-U'S ASSUMPTION OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY PORTFOLIO, HAS NOT MOVED UP.

22. O CHIN-U, A FULL GENERAL WHO WAS NAMED DEFENSE MINISTER ON MAY 14, MAY BE CONCURRENTLY HOLDING HIS FORMER JOB AS CHIEF OF STAFF. BEFORE HIS REASSIGNMENT, O WAS SIXTH RANKED IN THE KWP; IF CHOE HYON IS NO LONGER ON THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE, HE MAY HAVE MOVED UP ONE SLOT. O HAD SERVED AS CHIEF OF STAFF SINCE LATE 1968, WHEN KIM IL-SONG PURGED HIS TOP MILITARY OFFICERS, ACCUSING THEM OF THE SAME POLICY DEVIATION THAT HE IS ATTEMPTING TO ROOT OUT TODAY. IF NOT HURT IN THE CURRENT TURMOIL, O CHIN-U WILL REMAIN THE SECOND MOST POWERFUL MAN IN NORTH KOREA AND A KEY FIGURE IN EFFECTING THE SUCCESSION OF KIM CHONG-IL.

23. O PAEK-YONG, LIKE KIM CHOL-MAN, APPARENTLY CAME ONTO THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AT A SECRET PARTY PLENUM CONVENED EARLIER THIS YEAR. HE IS A FULL GENERAL AND ONE OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 207521

NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMISSION'S THREE VICE-CHAIRMEN. IN THE LATE 1950S, O HEADED THE KPA GUARD BUREAU; IN THE MID-

SIXTIES, HE WAS COMMONLY REGARDED AS THE OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WORKERS-PEASANTS RED MILITIA. AN ARTICLE

CONTRIBUTED BY O IN THE MARCH 1976 KULLOJA, THE THEORETICAL JOURNAL OF THE KWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE, SEEMS TO DESCRIBE KIM IL-SONG'S CURRENT CONFRONTATION WITH THE MILITARY IN TERMS OF A CRISIS FACED BY KIM IN THE 1930S. O PAEK-YONG ENTERED THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AS A CANDIDATE AND WAS PROMOTED TO FULL MEMBERSHIP FOUR DAYS AFTER O CHIN-U BECAME DEFENSE MINISTER.

24. TAE PYONG-YOL, ALTHOUGH NOT A MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE, HOLDS AN IMPORTANT POSITION AS HEAD OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF THE KWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE. IN JANUARY 1974 HE AUTHORED A KULLOJA ARTICLE THAT PRAISED THE PEOPLES MILITIA AND CALLED UPON THE PEOPLE (AND PRESUMABLY THE ARMY) TO RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE POLICY OF TOTAL MOBILIZATION. TAE WAS LAST IDENTIFIED AS A LIEUTENANT GENERAL; AT THE FIFTH PARTY CONGRESS IN 1970, HE WAS RANKED 39TH IN THE KWP.

25; YI YONG-MU, HEAD OF THE KPA'S GENERAL POLITICAL BUREAU SINCE 1974, IS A COLONEL GENERAL AND A LOW-RANKED FULL MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE. HIS FEBRUARY 1975 ARTICLE IN KULLOJA DEALT AT LENGTH ON THE "WEAPONS VERSUS MEN" ISSUE.

26. YIM CHUN-CHU APPARENTLY REPLACED KIM CHUNG-NIN AS HEAD OF THE KWP LIAISON BUREAU IN SEPTEMBER 1975, THEREBY WINNING HIS CURRENT PLACE AS THE 10TH RANKED MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE. YIM WAS DEPUTY HEAD OF THE BUREAU--WHICH OVERSEES NORTH KOREAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY TARGETED AGAINST SOUTH KOREA--IN THE MID-FIFTIES, AND HE MAY HAVE SERVED AS ITS DIRECTOR IN THE 1960S. YIM WAS ON THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE FORMED IN 1966, BUT HE WAS PURGED--FOR REASONS STILL NOT KNOWN--IN 1967. FOR THE LAST FOUR YEARS, HE HAS BEEN SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLES COMMITTEE, A BODY CREATED IN 1972 TO STRENGTHEN PARTY CONTROL OVER GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS. END ANNEX. ROBINSON
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 207521

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 15 SEP 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL MILITARY RELATIONS, PARTY UNITY
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 AUG 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ShawDG
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE207521
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: INR/REA/NA:MCBAIRD
Enclosure: DG ALTERED
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D760320-0279
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t197608103/baaaepvl.tel
Line Count: 366
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN INR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ShawDG
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 JUL 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <26 JUL 2004 by ElyME>; APPROVED <02 NOV 2004 by ShawDG>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: POLITICAL ANALYSIS: NORTH KOREA; POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE MILITARY
TAGS: MORG, PINT, KN
To: OIC PTC INFO NATO
ALL NATO CAPITALS
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006